THE TRUTH IS OUT THERE: CONSTRUCTING CONTAMINATION
by Paul KelleTt
The full article from which this extract is taken was published in both the EATA Newsletter No. 78, pp. 6-10, October 2003 and The Script, Vol. 34 No. 1, January-February 2004, pp. 1-2. No part of this article or extract may be reproduced without prior permission.
Introduction
Recent debates … have turned around arguments concerning the definition of fundamental TA concepts. These debates have been premised on a belief that there is an objective reality in which truths are waiting to be discovered; the truth is out there. I shall argue that there can be no universal or objective criteria by which TA concepts can be diagnosed, and use the concept of contamination to illustrate my argument. I do this by applying a critique derived from a social philosophy known as Social Constructionism. This philosophy is situated within the paradigm of Relativism and I briefly outline the core proposals of this paradigm in contrast to those of Positivism. I then offer a new definition of contamination and considerations concerning the process of decontamination.
Competing Paradigms
Different approaches or models in psychotherapy (as in any discipline) consist of concepts that are based on a core set of philosophical principles, or beliefs from which a story is constructed that creates meaning about what we experience. A paradigm represents such a story and specifies ways of applying such ideas (a methodology) in order to identify and operate upon the concepts it constructs. Positivism and relativism, for example, represent two famous paradigms in the field of science.
Newton vs. Einstein
Isaac Newton proposed a story about the universe in line with the positivistic paradigm, which said that there is one reality which can be looked at objectively. Furthermore, if we look at reality objectively enough, we will all agree about our interpretation of reality (truth) and thus construct ‘facts’. As an example, two people with identical watches would measure the same amount of time between one event and another. However, in 1905, Albert Einstein made up a new story in which the measurement of time is dependent on other aspects of our experience such as how fast we’re going and how close we are to heavy objects. After 1905, the watch of someone travelling very fast in space measured time very differently when compared with that of someone sat at home. These two people can now no longer agree about what time it is – they cannot agree on an ‘objective reality’. Einstein’s physics gave birth to theories of relativity which were unpopular with scientists of the day, including Einstein himself. "God" he said, "does not play dice" in his famous appeal to an objectifying deity. Unfortunately for Einstein, his efforts to prove his theories wrong were met with resounding silence and eventually he and others built on these theories the consequences of which have been filtering through to our ideas in psychology and psychotherapy about peoples’ less scientific experiences. This new story lead to a philosophy called relativism; a paradigm that proposes that time, reality and truth are relative and not absolute.
The ‘Turn to Language’
Wittgenstein and Austin
Partly because people started realising that, thanks to Einstein, they now had a hard time defining reality, some philosophers suggested that reality was a mirage created through and by language. Ludwig Wittgenstein pointed out that we use language selectively according to what he called language games, with which people use familiar forms of argument to organise the meaning of what they do (he referred to the latter as practices). Importantly, this meant that the meaning of any given concept (word) was situated within the language game in which the word was deployed. In his ‘Philosophical Investigations’ (1953:43) he offered the following provocative definition;
"The meaning of a word is its use in the language"
Taking this argument further, he suggested that meaning and knowledge are products of language as it is situated and deployed within specific cultural practices (he called these forms of life). This meant that there is no way to objectively judge the meaning of a statement outside the form of life in which it was produced. That is, meaning and ‘reality’ can only be shared to the extent that language is shared. John Austin (1962) went on to argue that language performs actions which define ’reality’. These actions, or speech acts have differing force or authority dependent upon the language game in which they are deployed and the position of the speaker (as well as those of the listeners). He used the example of a dignitary naming a ship at a ceremony. The naming (speech act) by a recognised authority figure is part of a ritual (language game) which constructs an object that ‘becomes’ a named, recognisable object; a ship. So, rather than asking, ‘what action or object does language represent?’ Austin asked, ‘what action or object does language create?’ Language determines meaning and reality.
Structural and Post-Structural Linguistics
Martin Heidegger proposed that the ‘objective world’ be bracketed off since we cannot agree a universally acceptable description of reality. As a way of illustrating this concept, I would now have to alter the title of this paper like this:
THE TRUTH IS [OUT THERE]
Jaques Derrida (1978) suggested that, since certain complex philosophical words are indefinable they should be placed under erasure; the ‘suspension’ of the definition of certain words that have no objective, universal meaning. One example is the word ‘truth’, though Derrida’s most famous example was the verb ‘to be’. So we now have to alter my title like this:
THE TRUTH IS [OUT THERE]
Michel Foucault saw meaning as being structured in terms of discourse, "a group of statements which provide a language for talking about – a way of representing the knowledge about – a particular topic at a particular historical moment"(1). Where such discourse as a representation of a way of thinking or state of knowledge becomes institutionalised, the resulting discursive formation will be empowered with the status of truth. TA for example, represents a discursive formation within the more general discourse of psychiatry. Foucault went on to argue that discursive formations are inextricably bound up with struggles of power and authority and definitions of what is ‘true’, ‘reality’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. The deployment of knowledge as ‘truth’ through discursive formations thus gives rise to discursive practices, the use of language to assert authoritative ‘truth’. Foucault used the concept of ‘madness’ to illustrate this process. Only after definitions of madness were produced through a specific discursive formation (psychiatry) and put into institutional practice was the object ‘madness’ made meaningful; ‘madmen’ existed only once they had been defined as such by psychiatrists.
Implications for Transactional Analysis
As TA therapists, we are situated within the discursive formation of TA psychotherapy (itself drawing authority from the discourse of Western psychiatric and scientific practices) and thus we construct the objects that determine our ‘reality’. TA theory proposes and describes these objects (such contamination) and a methodology for defining them (diagnosis) and thus constructs the objects it proposes. Importantly, in defining ‘contamination’ and offering criteria by which contamination can be diagnosed, TA creates contamination. This particular form of construction represents pathologising in the psychological literature. We bring about what we invent. Situated humanistic assumptions then add value to these objects (i.e. ‘good’ or ‘bad’). As TA practitioners, we may subscribe to these values and thus perceive them as universal ‘truths’, but they remain situated beliefs. These values are then (re)produced as ‘truth’ through the discursive practice of TA psychotherapy.
Contamination
Firstly, how might a definition of ‘delusion’ look when taking into account the considerations presented above?
A ‘delusion’ represents the labelling of an act by a person as defined by another perceived as authoritative, on the basis of the definer’s position, frame of reference, appeal to accepted cultural norms and purpose in arguing for such a definition.
I use ‘act’ in the sense that Austin proposed, thus including acts of speech (declaration) as well as other modes of behaviour (including ‘internal beliefs’ or stories). In TA terminology we might say that an ‘act’ represents a thought, feeling or action. I've included the reference to ‘purpose’ in order to recognise the part played by people’s perceptions of others motivation and interest when assessing the persuasiveness of an argument (Potter, 1997, calls this ‘stake’).
These considerations imply consequences for a definition of contamination. First, ‘contaminated’ represents a label, which one person uses to describe someone else’s functioning. A person running a contamination is unlikely to agree on another person’s interpretation of their experience, and they cannot meaningfully declare their own judgement contaminated ( Irving , 2001).
Second, there are no ‘real’ or ‘externally validating’ criteria to support such a definition. The person doing the labelling appeals to cultural values and discourse, (which include ‘reason’ and accepted definitions) and use their authority to support their argument and persuade others to see things as they do. That is, the narrative, or story that one uses to argue for a position, and the construction of the meaning (or plausibility) of that story in relation to another person will determine ‘reality’ or ‘truth’; in this case, whether or not someone is running a contamination.
Third, a person can only be persuaded that their thinking is contaminated where the consequences of their thinking conflict with their own acknowledged goals or other beliefs. That is, only when the client shares the therapist’s diagnosis of internal incongruity within the client’s frame of reference will that client ‘see’ and integrate a previous contamination. Like words, the meaning of values and beliefs are relative (situated) and decontamination thus represents the relational re-structuring of internal meaning. Keith Tudor (personal communication, 2002) suggested that this represented a co-creation of contamination. Through the externalisation of their internal worlds, the client and therapist define between them the client’s contamination - all contaminations are thus relational contaminations.
In the light of these arguments, I offer the following relational definition and diagnosis of ‘contamination’;
A contamination labels (structurally) a thought, feeling or action or (functionally) thinking, feeling or doing which the client believes to represent a consensual ‘truth’ of the Integrated Adult but which the therapist attributes to a fixated ego state.
- A contamination represents a client act identified by the therapist that conflicts with the client’s stated goals or appears internally incongruent within the client’sframe of reference. This act, if changed or abandoned, would further the attainment of contract goals as agreed by the client and therapist.
- A contamination represents a client act identified by the therapist that conflicts with the therapist’s understanding of situated, consensual social values. Thus, the therapist’s understanding of situated cultural values as well as the client’s ego state content (history) and function (process) will form the basis of contamination definition.
- Identification and client acceptance of contamination begins the process of decontamination and thus represents a contractual and relational negotiation between client and therapist. The process of decontamination represents a re-structuring of internal meaning for the client and a re-construction of their frame of reference.
Conclusion
In the story I have told above, language is no neutral reflection of an objective reality. Rather, the latter is an illusion created by the former. Words are constructive actions such that narratives relationally enact powerful, subjective meanings. The client’s meaning making is a function of their narrative; a story about identity and relating. This story is situated within wider cultural discourses and is (re)produced through language. After decontamination (or any effective therapeutic intervention) the client may tell (himself and others) a new story from a here-and-now, integrating Adult position. Story telling determines ‘reality’. We ‘are’, in a fundamental sense, the story we tell about ourselves, other people and our world. Our ‘reality’ represents experiences which we ‘subject’ to our subjectifying frame of reference. In this sense, our frame of reference represents our book of tales. By becoming aware of this book of tales we can take more responsibility for our reality, and resist the grandiose temptation to believe that we’ve come closest to defining the ‘truth that is really out there’.
REFERENCES
Austin, J. (1962) How to do things with words, Oxford , Clarendon Press.
Derrida, J. (1978) Writing and Difference, London , Routledge.
Irving, N. (2001) Helping to resolve contaminated thinking in clients, Part 1, TA UK, 60: 9-14 and Part 2, TA UK 61: 19-23.
Potter, J. (1997) Discourse Analysis as a way of analysing naturally occurring talk in Silverman, D. (ed) Qualitative Research; Theory, Method and Practice, London, Sage.
Wittgenstein, L. (1953/1958) Philosophical Investigations, Trans. G. E. M., Anscombe, Oxford , Blackwell, 2 nd edition, 1958.
(1) Hall (1992:291)