Response to Hine's letter
by Paul Kellett

Dear Editor,

Thank you for offering me the opportunity to respond to Mervyn Hine’s letter concerning my article ‘Constructing Contamination’ in the January/February Issue of The Script. Realist objections to relativism have been comprehensively addressed over the past few decades and I do not believe that this journal is an appropriate setting to recap this debate. Nonetheless, I am happy to address Hine’s objections concerning my reading of relativist theory and the value of constructionist principles for transactional analysis as well as the impact of neuroscientific findings on transactional analytic theory.

Einstein vs. Hine

In his letter, (Hine 2004: 5) Hine asserts that Einstein “provided a more precise objective reality, again the same for everyone” (my italics). Compare this to the words of Steven Hawking (2001:109) holder of the Lucasian chair at Cambridge which Sir Isaac Newton once held.

“Each observer has his or her own measure of time along the path he or she is following … there is no absolute time that we can use to label events.”

There is no absolute time. Time is a fundamental part of our observable four-dimensional ‘reality’. If there is no absolute time, there is no absolute reality. Now, it may be that Hine is suggesting that the only universal, objective reality upon which we can agree is that there is no universal, objective reality. In this I agree, but would point out that this renders meaningless the concept of one reality that is the same for everyone. In my article I illustrated relativist and constructionist principles with this very example from the general theory of relativity. However, these principles were also developed as a response to quantum theory, which offers even more vivid, if complicated support. Readers may be familiar with the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, for example, or Schrodinger’s famous Cat. Quantum theories such as these, as well as other mathematical models, such as the Incompleteness Theorem proposed by Kurt Godel, or the developing area of Chaos Theory, demonstrate the impossibility of human observation determining the nature of ‘reality’, at least without changing this reality through the act of observation alone. Even if there is some abstract state we could call ‘reality’, we cannot know it! These ideas further demonstrate the untenable paradoxes inherent in attempting to view human experience in terms of a single, objective reality.

How can it be that Hawking and Hine hold such contrasting interpretations of Einstein’s universe? We need not be surprised, since such plurality demonstrates the constructionist principle that we construct different ‘realities’ and use words and other discursive practices (such as talking or writing letters) to make these constructs ‘true’ for ourselves and others. Dixi.

 

Out of the Closet

Hine ‘deplores’ “the defeatist position of the constructivists in denying the existence of a real world common to all of us” (ibid.). As I have shown elsewhere (see my letter, TAJ 34:1) such deploring is based on a discounting of the meaning of relativism.

There is no contradiction between being a relativist and being somebody, a member of a particular culture, having commitments [and] beliefs … These are the very things to be argued for, questioned, defended, decided, without the comfort of just being, already and before thought, real and true . The idea that letting go of realism entails that all these commitments must fall, is no more convincing than the idea that life without God is devoid of meaning and value. Indeed the argument is remarkably similar … as is the refutation: the death of God has not made the rest of the world disappear, but has left it for us to make. (my italics)  

Edwards et al. (1995:35-6) cited in Wetherell and Still (1997:111)

I wonder whom Hine would include as “all of us” in his ‘real’ world. Is it not, after all, evidently absurd to claim that all people on Earth share a common view of the world? Are we, then, also to label those who hold contrary views to those held by ourselves ‘false’, as Hine labels my views in his letter? We need not find ourselves locked in this particular closet if we take a relativist approach to meaning making and allow for multiple interpretations of experience which generate, in turn, multiple realities. Such a relativistic approach is far more empathic and facilitative for us as therapists in contrast to the discounting of views held by others that results from a “continuing indulgence in the Newtonian fantasy” (Leahey, 1992:481). The problem is that, if we adopt Hine’s ‘reality’, then we must all invest enough authority in someone (a famous physicist, perhaps) or something (an elusive mathematical theory of everything) that can pronounce ultimate judgement on what is right and who is wrong. While this may represent a very human, if archaopsychic desire (Lacan, 1989) I do not believe it represents an enlightened, neopsychic position or one that facilitates effective psychotherapy.

 

Windlass or Fancy?

Hine reduces my exposition of post-modern linguistic theory to the slogan, “words evolve following the whims of users”. I am not clear what Hine means by “whims”. One definition I found defines a whim as “a sudden fancy” ( Thompson, ed.1995: 1596) and I suspect that Hine intends this meaning as a discount of Wittgenstein ’s thinking. An alternative definition offered (ibid.) is one denoting an archaic mechanism, a ‘windlass’, by which ore was raised from a mine. That is, an age-old method for drawing out raw material from obscure depths and from which we construct the objects of our world. A process, perhaps, by which we make ‘real’ (conscious) our (unconscious) internal world. But I am, no doubt, being too fanciful. If Hine is suggesting that word usage (the contextual definition of a word) evolves through people’s use of a word in language, then this is in agreement with Wittgenstein ’s argument. Indeed, this represents one way by which words gain authoritative recognition (inclusion in dictionaries). As transactional analysts we are all familiar with such a process. Berne himself originated the trend of evolving colloquialisms as metaphors for psychotherapeutic concepts. And, perhaps, Berne ’s contribution could be regarded as whimsical according to both of these definitions of the word! What Hine ’s slogan omits, however, is the formative function of the social in determining meanings and, consequently, realities. Language games and the authority or power of the speaker also plays a formative role, as I have made clear. That is, as we use a word within speech acts, our authority as well as the word’s context within historically situated discursive practices constructs our worlds.

Let me offer an illustration. ‘Racket’, a word denoting a metaphor for several concepts, has a special set of meanings within transactional analysis, a discursive practice that can be classified under several language games, such as a medical discourse. Those who originated the term have been invested with enough authority (power) by other transactional analysts to make the concept, word and definition (a link between word and concept) ‘real’. If we as therapists then diagnose a client as ‘running a racket’, and the client and relevant others, such as consultants invest us with enough power, then a consensual reality evolves (Schiff, et al., 1975) such that the client is running a racket. Sadly, my edition of the Oxford Dictionary does not offer a transactional analytic definition of ‘racket’, though it does, interestingly also define this word as “a way of life” ( Thompson, ed.1995: 1129). Perhaps this is not so very different from our transactional analytic meaning. Either way, as Hine himself admits (ibid.) “the words are the same but their meanings differ”, that is, meaning is relative to context.

 

The Santa Claus

Let me turn briefly to the zeitgeist of neuroscience, which is currently providing some with fresh metaphors for transactional analytic concepts. Hine complains that I ignore recent developments in this field, arguing that ‘neural mechanisms’ parallel ‘mental activities’ and that contamination may be an ‘objective property’ of the nervous system. Hine ’s argument seems to me a naïve fantasy in which neuroscience represents the long awaited Santa Claus (Berne , 1961) promising to provide some mythical, incontestable ‘reality’. It has been recognised for some time within the field of psychology that complex subjective experiences do not reduce to a more ‘scientific’ account at a biochemical level. Almost twenty years ago, Willner (1985) for example, pointed out that there are differing domains of explanation of our experiences, and he listed the biochemical, physiological, cognitive and experiential. Explanations of mental phenomena in one domain do not map directly onto one another. That is, aspects of our conscious and unconscious being cannot be meaningfully reduced to biochemical activityalone. Contamination may be regarded in part, as an emergent property of complex, non-localised neuronal activity and, indeed, we may so regard all mental phenomena. Yet it is a grandiose fiction to assert that contamination, or any other transactional analytic construct can be mapped onto specific bits of the physical brain (the fallacy of ‘modularity’) or paralleled by some isolated biochemical ‘neural mechanism’, as though artificial intelligence equals, rather than mimics human processes of meaning making. Misconceptions such as this result, in part, from mistaking transactional analytic concepts for ‘real things’ (Loria, 2003) a trap inherent in discounting constructionist considerations.

Re-creation

A person’s view of the world represents intersubjective interpretations of his or her experiences and “in most human interaction, ‘realties’ are the result of prolonged and intricate processes of construction and negotiation deeply embedded in culture” (Bruner, 1990:24-5). As transactional analysts, if we ignore this existential given of human existence and follow Hine’s call to look for his a priori reality behind every word our clients utter, our potential to cure will be blocked and we will end up pathologising clients from a one-up position. As Allen (2003: 136) concludes, “the roles of constructivism and expectancy need to be included, I believe, in consideration of any group of core concepts.” Indeed, without such constructionist considerations, transactional analysis would be robbed of its humanistic heart and existential mind. Neuroscientific reductionism violates the holistic approach of humanism in its conception of the whole person as well as the centrality of decisions in the formation of personality. That is, an approach that discounts constructionist philosophy is anathema to our holistic view of the person as able to make decisions and achieve relational autonomy, awareness, intimacy and responsibility. Furthermore, Berne ’s phenomenological methodology emphasised the empathic valuing of clients’ realities and, in this, he integrated a central constructionist principle. Put simply, relativist and constructionist principles are central to our thinking and practice as transactional analysts.

 

Our intersubjective experiences represent the content, and language represents the function through which we construct our ‘realities’. Acknowledging this as therapists allows us to take responsibility for our values and meanings and to value those whose experiences are different to our own. The assumption that there is one universal reality, and that a particular ‘objective’ view of this reality is ‘true’, leads to the discounting, pathologising and, ultimately, alienation of other realities and individuals as not-OK. Rather, a constructionist philosophy supports transactional analytic philosophy, theory and practice as well as our identity as humanistic therapists concerned with promoting relational autonomy, awareness, intimacy and responsibility.

Each of us has the task each morning to re-create the universe from our central focus and this responsibility is unavoidable.”  

Groder (1976) cited in Barnes (1977:19)

References

Allen , J. (2003: 126-47) Concepts, Competencies and Interpretative Communities in, Transactional Analysis Journal 33 (2).
Barnes, G. (1977)Transactional Analysis after Eric Berne, New York, Hagerstown, San Francisco, London; Harper’s College Press.
Berne , E. (1961) Transactional Analysis in Psychotherapy, Souvenir Press Ltd.
Bruner, J. (1990)Ideology, Rhetoric and Opinion, London ; Sage.
Hawking, S. (2001)The Universe in a Nutshell, London , New York , Toronto , Sydney , Auckland ; Bantam Press.
Hine , M. (2004: 5) Members Forum, The Script.
Leahey, T. (1992) A History of Psychology: Main Currents in Psychological Thought (3 rd Edition) Englewood Cliffs , New Jersey ; Prentice Hall.
Lacan, (1989) Ecrits: a Selection, London and New York , Routledge.
Loria, B. (203: 192-200) Wither Transactional Analysis: Obsolescence or Paradigm Shift? in, Transactional Analysis Journal 33 (2).
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Wetherell, M. and Still, A. (1997: 99-115) Realism and Relativism in Sapsford, S. ( ed ) Issues for Social Psychology, Milton Keynes ; Open University.
Willner, P. (1985) Depression – a Psychobiological Synthesis, New York ; John Wiley.